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ABSTRACT  
 
The paper addresses the question of who benefits from public recreation areas. Employing a 
set of survey data from users and nonusers of state-owned recreation and conservation areas 
in Finland, we derive two measures for distributional analysis. The first, the income elasticity 
of willingness to pay for recreation services, indicates that public provision of recreation 
benefits lower-income groups more than higher-income groups. The second, a welfare 
measure including efficiency loss, reveals ambiguous impacts depending on the level of the 
fee implemented. Low fee levels decrease recreation visits among lower-income users, 
whereas high fees reduce the welfare level of higher-income users in particular. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long been concerned about whether government provision of 
public goods benefits other than high-income groups despite the initial political intention of 
serving the needs of all citizens (Besley & Coate 1991). Interestingly, recreation services in 
national parks provided by the government have both a private good component – captured by 
the use of the services – and a public good component – seen, for example, in users’ 
preferences with regard to nature conservation. Previous studies that have estimated 
conventional income elasticity measures for the private good demand for outdoor recreation 
facilities categorize recreation as a luxury good (Borcherding & Deaton 1972, Bergstrom & 
Goodman 1973). More recent studies have shown that at least the use of recreation services 
seems to be biased towards relatively wealthy people (e.g., Cordell et al. 2002, Pouta & 
Sievänen 2001). An intuitive explanation is that when there are costs involved in the use of 
recreation services, e.g. travel and equipment, higher-income households can better afford to 
enjoy public recreation services. Countering this, of course, is the argument that as recreation 
is a time-consuming activity, the opportunity cost of time is lower for households with lower 
incomes; for example, evidence from travel cost studies indicates that the income elasticity 
for changes in recreational consumer surplus is less than one (Morey et al. 1993).  
There is some evidence, however, that other than user values, e.g. conservation 
and the cultural values associated with national parks and wilderness areas, are as important 
as opportunities to use these areas (Aldy et al. 1999, Huhtala 2004). Like use of recreation 
services (a private good), nature protection or other programs to improve the quality of the 
environment (public goods) are often classified as luxury demand (e.g., Baumol & Oates 
1989), even though few studies have actually considered the environmental equity issues 
associated with conserving unique ecosystems (as pointed out, e.g., by Aldy et al. 1999). In 
fact, the income elasticity of willingness to pay (WTP) for ecosystem services provided by the 
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environment (clean air, water purification, pollination) is typically found to be less than one in 
contingent valuation studies, indicating that ecosystem services are to be considered normal 
goods (Kriström & Riera 1996, Hökby & Söderqvist 2003, Horowitz & McConnell 2003).  
Given the mixed evidence, financing public recreation services becomes a 
puzzling task at least where equity is concerned. Major motives for governments to subsidize 
recreation services are the positive impact of outdoor recreation on health and well-being and 
the environmental education promoted by nature conservation areas. Implementing user fees 
for state-owned recreation areas would shift the financial burden from all taxpayers to the 
actual users. Here the fundamental question becomes how alternative funding schemes (taxes 
or user fees) affect the distribution of net benefits of public recreation services. In order to 
translate benefits into welfare gains, we need to measure how different individuals 
(users/nonusers; “the rich”/”the poor”) value public recreation services. 
We study the relationship between income and WTP for collectively provided 
state-owned recreation and conservation areas in Finland to determine the distribution of 
benefits from the current recreation services financed by all taxpayers and the potential 
impacts of implementing user fees. Previous studies, particularly those in the US, have 
extensively examined issues of equity and the appropriateness of the fees charged (for a 
review, see Williams & Black 2002). The research indicates that higher fees would have a 
discriminatory impact on low-income users and that revenue-maximizing fees would price a 
considerable proportion of the present users of national forests out of the market (e.g., Reiling 
et al. 1992, Teasley et al. 1994). Nevertheless, in 2004 the US Congress passed the Federal 
Lands Recreation Enhancement Act, which authorizes federal land management agencies to 
charge recreational use fees and retain the revenues. For example, the United States Forest 
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Service (USFS) has introduced fees at about 60% of its forests and has more than doubled its 
total recreation fee revenues in ten years (Espey 2005).  
The Nordic countries differ fundamentally from the US, however, in that their 
institutions include a common right of access to all natural (undeveloped) areas where the 
latter has a certain tradition of charging for recreational access to public lands (Espey 2002). 
Given this difference, we investigate a representative sample of the Finnish population that 
includes both users and nonusers of the recreation services provided by all of the state-owned 
outdoor recreation parks. The data used are a sub-sample of the extensive National Survey of 
the Finnish Outdoor Recreation (Sievänen 2001). The survey included questions eliciting 
people's willingness to pay for recreation services in state-owned recreation and conservation 
areas. 
The few studies that have determined the income elasticity of WTP from stated 
preference surveys have mainly used meta-analysis (Schläpfer 2006) and paid less attention to 
survey-specific factors such as respondents’ familiarity with the good valued, payment 
vehicle used, and distribution of income in the parent population. As we are not trying to 
settle definitively the issue of income effects in contingent valuation surveys, we focus 
instead on a single data set; however, we go beyond the income elasticity of WTP and, for 
comparison, investigate the consumer surplus by income group non-parametrically - free from 
specification of functional forms, estimation methods, etc. First, we derive the income 
elasticity of willingness to pay for recreation services for several respondent categories of the 
survey sample. The categories were determined by use behavior (user/nonuser) and by the fee 
payment scheme suggested in the WTP questionnaire (recreation pass/tax). The payment 
scheme is interesting in that fees are considered regressive while at least some forms of taxes 
(income) used for financing recreation services are viewed as progressive (see discussion in 
 6 
More 1999). The income elasticity of WTP tells us whether the share of WTP allocated to 
recreation services decreases or increases with income in each category. Second, we estimate 
a consumer surplus measure from marginal WTP curves for two income groups (lower-
/higher-than-median income). These consumer surplus measures are illustrative for addressing 
questions such as who benefits most from the recreation services. Interestingly, the point 
estimates of the income elasticity of WTP show that current policies favor the lower-income 
group and fees would reduce welfare, whereas consumer surplus measures give a more 
detailed and mixed picture. Welfare changes depend on efficiency losses, which in part 
depend on the fee level implemented.  
The paper is organized as follows. The section to follow discusses the 
hypotheses and briefly describes the statistical methods used. The next two sections present 
the data and the results of the demand analysis, respectively. The concluding section discusses 
policy implications with a special emphasis on whether public funding of recreation services 
is justified and, if so, to which extent and on which grounds. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND STATISTICAL METHODS APPLIED 
In order to analyze the distributional impacts of public provision of subsidized 
recreation services, it is necessary to estimate the incidence of benefits from these services. 
Obvious indicators for determining benefit incidence are estimates of income elasticity and 
consumer surplus measures. Two measures can be derived from our survey data: an estimate 
of the income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods and a welfare measure consisting of 
a monetary measure of utility change based on a hypothetical contingent valuation scenario.  
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The income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods 
The theoretical literature has emphasized that a clear distinction should be made 
between the income elasticity of demand and the income elasticity of WTP (Hanemann 1991, 
Flores & Carson 1997, Ebert 2003). The income elasticity of WTP is an elasticity derived for 
a “virtual price” for environmental quality elicited in contingent valuation studies. The 
income elasticity of WTP is of the form εw=d(ln WTP)/d(lnM), where M is income. The 
income elasticity of WTP, εw, indicates whether the share of WTP allocated to the recreation 
services in question decreases or increases with income. The distribution of environmental 
benefits is “pro poor” if εw<1, proportional if εw=1, and “pro rich” if εw>1. (See, e.g., Hökby 
& Söderqvist 2003.) 
Given that a payment card was used for eliciting WTP responses, we derive the 
income elasticity of WTP from demand functions estimated by interval regression (see, e.g., 
Greene 1998, Maddala 2001, Woolridge 2002). The essence of the estimation procedure is to 
take into account the fact that WTP responses cannot be considered deterministic point 
estimates but are known only for the intervals, i, used in the bid vector (Cameron & Huppert 
1989). (See Appendix 1 for the econometric model and the log-likelihood function.) We use a 
lognormal conditional distribution for valuations, or yi = ln(WTPi) ~ N[0,σ
2
], whereby the 
mean of the untransformed WTP variable is exp(βx+σ2/2) and the median is exp(βx). This 
indicates that the mean as a welfare measure is sensitive to the disturbance standard deviation, 
σ. Following Kriström and Riera (1996), we use income, M, in a logarithmic form as the only 
explanatory variable such that βx = α+βMlnM. The income elasticity of mean WTP calculated 
from the model is then [ln ] / lnw ME WTP Mε β= ∂ ∂ = . 
 8 
Consumer surplus measures 
As regards our second indicator of distributional impacts, the welfare measure, 
the wording of the WTP question determines which surplus measure is actually employed 
(see, e.g., Johansson 1987). Since the respondents were asked about their willingness to 
contribute to financing the same range of recreation services in state-owned parks as is 
currently provided by the government free of charge, WTP is a measure of (quantity-
constrained) equivalent variation. In other words, the ex post level of utility will potentially be 
lower if a payment is charged for recreation services. The welfare measure, equivalent 
variation, expresses the maximum sum of money that individuals should be charged to make 
them as well off as they would be with a reduction in recreational services (Johansson, pp. 62-
64). 
To illustrate the distributional impacts of fees on the equivalent variation 
(consumer) surplus, we apply a marginal willingness to pay (demand) curve such as that 
shown in Fig. 1. Initially, consumer surplus is equal to the area 0aQ1, referring to trip quantity 
level Q1 and price level 0. Implementing a fee raises the price to P and reduces consumer 
surplus to the triangle Pab such that the welfare loss for the consumer is 0PbQ1. As revenues 
accruing to the managing agency are equal to the area 0PbQ2, the social cost of implementing 
the fee is the efficiency loss (deadweight loss) Q2bQ1. From an equity standpoint, it is 
important to compare welfare losses and the associated efficiency losses for consumers in 
different income categories. The size of the efficiency loss is essential since it gives a 
monetary estimate of the loss for previous users discouraged from using services due to the 
fee. 
In the empirical analysis, we adopt a nonparametric iterative procedure which 
generates a survival function. The survival function is directly estimated from the survey 
responses, taking the empirical distribution as the “true” distribution instead of imposing a 
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parametric distribution on the data. We will use the algorithm developed in Ayer et al. (1955), 
which was first applied in environmental valuation analyses by Kriström (1990). The method 
has been shown to yield a consistent maximum likelihood estimator (Cosslett 1983) that is 
particularly easy to compute when there are no covariates. The WTP observations are grouped 
in the WTP space into intervals according to the responses obtained.  
Objectives 
The point estimates for mean and median WTP will be estimated parametrically, 
which makes it possible to derive the income elasticity of WTP. Non-parametrically derived 
survival distributions are used for estimating the changes in welfare that would result from the 
implementation of fees. The welfare changes are calculated for two income groups of the 
population to illustrate the distribution of the burden of fees, or the incidence of benefits from 
currently subsidized recreation services.  As we hypothesize that not only income but also 
whether recreation services are perceived as private or public goods (or both) affects their 
perceived benefits, we identify the respondents’ use of the services as well as their reactions 
to alternative funding schemes. Consequently, we derive the WTP measures and the income 
elasticity of WTP separately for four subgroups characterized by use (nonusers/users) and the 
payment vehicle used in the survey sample (general tax/recreation pass). In addition, welfare 
changes are calculated for different fee levels reflecting whether the government considers all 
taxpayers (independent of use) or only users in determining the actual fee level.    
 
DATA 
We use data from an extensive national outdoor recreation survey carried out in 
Finland in the years 1997-2000 (Sievänen 2001). The sub-survey on the importance of public 
outdoor recreation services ultimately yielded 1,871 questionnaires, constituting a response 
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rate of 64%. The sample is representative of the Finnish population and includes both users 
and nonusers of state-owned recreation and conservation areas. Sampling, data collection, 
pre-testing and details of the mixed-mode survey (piloting, telephone and mail) are described 
in more detail in Virtanen et al. (2001). (See also Huhtala 2004.) 
The sub-survey data used here included answers to contingent valuation 
questions that were intended to reflect the respondents’ total annual WTP for recreation 
services in state-owned national parks and hiking areas. The respondents were asked about 
their willingness to contribute to financing the same range of services as is currently provided 
by the government free of charge. A recreation pass and a general tax earmarked for the 
provision of outdoor recreation services were used as payment vehicles in two separate sub-
samples. The respondents were asked to choose the sum that came closest to their valuation 
on a payment card (see, e.g., Mitchell & Carson 1989). The following amounts of money 
were listed on the card: FIM 0, 50, 100, 200, 300, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, over 2000 (1 
€=FIM 5.94
1
).  
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the raw WTP distribution from the payment 
card responses including zero responses, and captures the basis for our analysis of 
distributional impacts by comparing the mean WTP measures between lower- and higher-
income groups within both payment vehicles. Although respondents with higher incomes had 
a higher WTP, the difference between income groups did not prove to be statistically 
significant. Interestingly, the proportion of respondents indicating zero WTP was highest 
(lowest) in the lower-than-median (higher-than-median) income group when a tax (a 
recreation pass) was used as the payment vehicle. This clearly runs contrary to the assumption 
                                                 
1
 Finland adopted the euro (€) as its currency on January 1, 2002; the Finnish mark was the country’s official 
currency at the time of the survey. The exact wording of the questions that elicited respondents’ WTP is given in 
Appendix 2. 
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of taxes being perceived as pro poor yet is a rational outcome if there are proportionally more 
low-income than high-income respondents who do not use the services at all.  
[Place Table 1 about here] 
  
The considerable number of respondents indicating a zero WTP could of course 
be a concern, but the answers to debriefing questions in the questionnaire import certain 
credence to our data set. Only 17% of the zero-WTP respondents (4% of the total sample) 
opposed any charge, because they felt that they had a right to use the recreation sites and 
services. On the other hand, 39% of the zero respondents (16% of the total sample) opposed a 
tax, because they considered taxes high enough already. The predicted probability of 
respondents being willing to pay something for recreation services (WTP>0) was about 70 % 
in the whole sample, which we consider a relatively realistic figure; especially so as about 
one-fifth (22%) of population actually uses these areas annually.   
To gain more insight into the mean WTP in income groups, the same 
comparisons were conducted among nonusers and users (Table 2). When only nonusers were 
studied, WTP was significantly higher among respondents with higher-than-median incomes 
where the payment vehicle was a general tax. Mean WTP was also compared between all 
nonusers and users. The difference was significant, with users of state recreation and 
conservation areas willing to pay FIM 25 more on average than nonusers. The difference 
between nonusers and users was especially high (FIM 52) among respondents whose income 
was below median when a tax was used as the payment vehicle. A mixed rationale for the 
lower-income group is consistent when their use behavior is taken into account: nonusers do 
not necessarily want additional taxes, and users benefit if taxes are progressive.  
[Place Table 2 about here] 
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According to these comparisons, income is an important variable for benefit 
considerations, but WTP is also affected by interactions with personal use of recreation 
services and payment vehicle. As both of these variables are in part related to whether 
recreation services are perceived as private and/or public goods, the picture of benefit 
distribution becomes richer and more challenging to analyze. The benefits for nonusers come 
exclusively from public good considerations, and altruistic motives are likely to play a role. In 
a similar manner, tax payments, in contrast to fees, dissociate willingness to pay from own 
use only. Willingness to pay taxes then expresses a general interest in allocating resources to 
recreation regardless of the ultimate beneficiaries. 
RESULTS 
To calculate the income elasticity of WTP, we need to evaluate the function 
relating WTP to income. While interval regression was used to correct for the range of values 
displayed on the payment card, we followed Cameron and Huppert and used midpoint of 
reported income category in estimations without attempting to compensate for the 
measurement error inherent in the income variable. Interval regressions were carried out 
separately for five sub-samples: a sample including all respondents, a sample including only 
nonuser (user) respondents, and a sample including respondents who had received a 
questionnaire presenting a general tax increase (recreation pass) as a payment vehicle. Table 3 
summarizes the estimation results.  
[Place Table 3 about here] 
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In every sample, the estimate of the income elasticity of WTP, wε , receives a 
value considerably below one, indicating that policies providing recreation areas favor “the 
poor”. However, it is appropriate to focus on samples where the income variable is 
statistically significant (samples “All”, “Nonusers”, and “Tax” in Table 3).  This comparison 
suggests that a tax has the largest income effect ( 0.20wε = ). Hence, the low-income groups 
would not necessarily favor tax financing of the current policy if a user fee were an option. 
This result is in line with a previous empirical finding on progressive payment vehicles 
(Schläpfer 2006). However, an economically more intuitive explanation for our finding here 
could be the sensitivity of the payment vehicle to use behavior. Recall that the tax option 
generated a statistically significant difference in WTP between nonusers and users in the low-
income group (Table 2), suggesting that nonusers who dislike tax financing may dominate the 
responses of those with a low income. This inference is also consistent with the finding that 
the income effect is slightly larger for nonusers ( 0.12wε = ) than for all respondents 
( 0.10wε = ), but as the difference is minimal one should be careful to avoid 
overinterpretation. We cannot say anything definite about the respondents who had actually 
used the recreation services, because the income coefficient was not statistically significant. 
Accordingly, we analyze empirical WTP distribution non-parametrically in the following. If 
one were to draw conclusions from the point estimates presented in Table 3, the most 
conservative overall assessment would still be that current policy does not discriminate 
against those with lower incomes, because the income elasticities turned out to be low.  
To get a more comprehensive picture of the distributional impacts between 
income groups, we examine the entire empirical WTP distribution and observed use. In what 
follows we will use the Ayer estimator, because it describes the empirical distribution without 
parametric constraints. The estimator generates a median WTP of FIM 84, which is a 
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considerably higher estimate than the parametric ones reported in Table 3. However, the 
differences in the distribution of WTP as such are important for a comparison of welfare 
changes between income groups. To compare the impacts on high-income and low-income 
user respondents, we derive WTP survival distributions by income group to estimate the loss 
of consumer surplus for alternative policy scenarios involving fees. 
Using the empirical distribution generated by the Ayer estimator we can now 
approximate the “true” demand schedule by calibrating the number of visits at the zero fee 
level to the current number of visits by the population as predicted by the sample of users, i.e., 
over 6.2 million per year. As the demand is expressed in terms of total number of visits, the 
WTP must be adjusted for the number of visits reported by the respondents.  
Fig. 2 gives a first impression of the differences in demand for recreation 
between the income groups. The demand curve seems to be more elastic for the lower-income 
than for the higher-income group at low fee levels, but high fees produce a considerable effect 
for higher-income groups as well. This indicates that there are differences in the demand 
elasticities by income group, and we get an important insight into the welfare impact of a 
chosen fee level. 
Normally it is assumed that the median voter in the overall population 
determines the level of the user fee, should one be implemented. Both users and nonusers 
would participate in any putative referendum and our findings indicate that these groups 
together would support a median WTP of FIM 84. As the government would collect fee 
revenue only from users, however, it might use different estimates of visit frequencies when 
considering the appropriate fee level. The average number of visits per year is 1.35 for the 
whole population, including nonusers, and 7.08 for users only. Table 4 summarizes the results 
for the welfare changes for two fee scenarios using the Ayer estimator: Scenario I) An annual 
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fee of FIM 63 (about € 11) per visit, which is the WTP accepted by a median voter (FIM 84) 
divided by the average number of visits for the whole population (1.35); and Scenario II) An 
annual fee of FIM 12 (about € 2) per visit, which is the WTP accepted by a median voter 
(FIM 84) divided by the average number of visits per year for users only (7.08). To allow 
more reliable comparisons between groups we calculated both upper and lower bounds for the 
welfare measures for four separate income groups (see Boman et al. 1999). We report the 
changes per person as averages of upper and lower bound estimates in Table 4. 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
 
The results of Scenario I suggest that current policy favors “the rich”. In other 
words, a policy reform implementing a fee of FIM 63 per year would generate a larger 
welfare loss for those with a higher rather than a lower income. This suggests that a policy 
reform implementing a fee of FIM 63 per year would be more beneficial for the lower-income 
than for the higher-income group. Interestingly, this result contrasts with the results of our 
elasticity estimates. 
If we focus on welfare change, we find similar results in the case of Scenario II. 
The higher-income groups would seem to suffer a larger welfare loss if the fee policy were 
implemented. However, the results of benefit incidence become more ambiguous when we 
look at the efficiency loss in the case of a small fee. In the case of a small increase in 
recreation fee (from zero to FIM 12, or €2 in Scenario II), the lower-income group would 
suffer a larger efficiency loss than the higher-income group. This effect is the opposite of that 
seen in the case of a large increase in fee (from zero to FIM 63 or €11 in Scenario I). As the 
size of the efficiency loss gives a monetary estimate of the loss for previous users discouraged 
from using services due to a fee, the result shows that for the lower-income group even a low 
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fee would discourage the use of services by those who had previously taken advantage of 
them. 
The ratio of efficiency loss and welfare loss (EL/WL) is reported in Table 4, 
illustrating the magnitude of the efficiency loss for the two income groups at the two fee 
levels. At a low fee level the share of efficiency loss is higher in the lower-income group 
(44%) than in the higher-income group (28%). As the fee increases, the efficiency loss 
becomes relatively more important for the higher-income group. This effect is illustrated in 
Fig. 3, which depicts the welfare and efficiency losses and fee revenue at various fee levels 
for the two income groups. The figure also shows that the fee revenue remains relatively 
stable for the lower-income group, because no matter how small the fee might be, it affects 
the demand immediately by decreasing the use of recreation services. Those with a higher 
income would tolerate low fees, but the fee revenue would decrease at high fee levels.  
These results reflect a phenomenon commonly observed when estimating the 
demand elasticity of consumption goods: demand is more elastic for lower-income groups 
from zero fees to low fee levels, but high fee levels produce a considerable effect for higher 
income groups as well. Our findings underscore the importance of analyzing the welfare 
effects along the whole demand curve instead of focusing on point estimates of income 
elasticity.  
  
DISCUSSION 
We have investigated the patterns of distribution of benefits associated with 
recreation services. The results of our analysis indicate that nonusers also gain considerable 
benefits from public recreation services. The estimates of income elasticity of WTP show that 
provision of recreation services seems to benefit those with lower incomes more than those 
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with higher incomes. However, our analysis illustrates the problems associated with the use of 
point estimates of income elasticity in distributional analysis. From our case study we can 
conclude that analyzing welfare changes in components on various parts of the demand curve 
gives a more versatile picture of the distributional effects of a policy than can be had from 
point estimates of income elasticity.  
The results of our case study make it possible to evaluate the efficiency of 
alternative financing mechanisms for the agency providing recreation services. They show 
that the efficiency loss of a fee compared to fee revenue depended crucially on the fee level. 
At a lower level, the fee revenue was almost twice as high as the efficiency loss, but at a 
higher level the efficiency loss was approximately three times the fee revenue. By way of 
comparison, the efficiency loss of taxation in Finland (including commodity taxes) has been 
estimated at between 40 and 65 % depending on the supply elasticity of labor (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2002). In conclusion, our results indicate that financing using fees leads to 
higher efficiency if the fee level is low enough but that low fees would hurt those with lower 
incomes relatively more. In other words, there seems to be a certain trade-off between 
efficiency and equity. 
The paper also yields an interesting policy implication regarding use values, i.e., 
that the current policy of publicly provided free recreation services may in fact benefit those 
with higher incomes. Implementing fees would mean a welfare loss particularly for higher-
income people. However, even a modest fee decreases use of recreational areas by lower-
income individuals. This implies that if the policy goal is to impose a fee that has equally 
distributed welfare effects, the fee should be “high enough”, although this would necessitate a 
policy that recycles revenues from fees back to lower-income users. If the decision on a fee 
were made by the users only, they would vote for a fee that would be too low from an equity 
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point of view. Indeed, our results indicate that a majority voting in a referendum might yield 
the information necessary to establish the required fee level.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Formally, the econometric model is 
(1) y* =  βx  +  ε,  ε ~ N[0,σ2], 
 y   =  j  if  A(j-1)  ≤  y*  ≤  A(j), j = 1,...,J, A(0) = -∞, A(J) = +∞. 
Let Li and Ui denote the lower and upper limits of the payment card interval. If 
yi equals 1, Li is A(0) = -∞ and Ui is A(1), the first limit value given. The log-likelihood 
function for this model is 
(2) 
1
ln ln
N
i i
i
U x L x
L
β β
σ σ=
 − −    = Φ −Φ    
    
∑ ,  
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. Once the optimized β and σ 
have been attained, the conditional mean of y* for any given vector of variables will be βx. 
The model estimation is a standard procedure included in several computer packages. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Willingness to Pay Questions 
 
“The maintenance costs of recreation areas are publicly financed. The purpose of the 
following questions is to get some insight into HOW MUCH YOU VALUE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO USE STATE-OWNED RECREATION AREAS AND 
NATIONAL PARKS.” 
 
The wording of the question on WTP in the form of an entrance fee read: 
“Suppose that the users of recreation areas and national parks had to buy a personal 
recreation pass, the sales revenues from which would be used for maintenance of these 
areas. The pass would entitle one to access to the recreation areas and the use of basic 
services such as campfire sites, firewood, and waste disposal. 
 
How much would you be willing to pay at most for an annual recreation pass which 
would allow you to use state-owned recreation areas and national parks? 
 
The wording of the question on WTP in the form of taxes was similar:  
“Suppose that a general tax increase would be needed to maintain the basic services in 
recreation areas and national parks and their provision free of charge. The basic 
services include the use of campfire sites, firewood, and waste disposal and other 
basic facilities. 
 
How much more tax would you be willing to pay per year at most, if it were 
guaranteed that the additional tax revenues would be used for maintenance of 
recreation areas?” 
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Huhtala and Pouta, Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1. Impact of fee, P, on consumer surplus by components of welfare loss. 
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Huhtala and Pouta, Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. WTP distribution per visit by income group (lower-/higher-than median income, all). 
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Huhtala and Pouta, Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Fee revenue, efficiency and welfare loss by fee level in the income groups. 
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Table 1 Mean WTP per year (FIM) based on responses in the payment card, and proportion 
of zero WTP (%) by income group and payment vehicle in the data set (N=1582 ). 
 
Income Mean WTP(FIM)/Proportion WTP=0 (%) 
 Lower than median Higher than median 
Payment vehicle Tax FIM 90 / 40.2% FIM 105 / 33.7% 
 Recreation pass FIM 94 / 31.2% FIM 97 / 23.9% 
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Table 2. Mean WTP per year (FIM) among nonusers and users by income group and payment 
vehicle in the data set. 
 
Nonuser User 
Income 
Mean WTP(FIM) per year 
lower than 
median 
higher than 
median 
lower than 
median 
higher than 
median 
Payment vehicle Tax FIM 78
1)2) 
FIM 102
1) 
FIM 130
2) 
FIM 110 
 Recreation pass FIM 83 FIM 95 FIM 116 FIM 103 
 Both FIM 87
3) 
FIM 112
3) 
Notes: Superscripts indicate statistically significant differences: 1) among nonusers:  between income groups; 2) 
among the lower-than-median income group: between users and nonusers; and 3) between nonusers and users.  
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Table 3. Interval regression results, WTP and income elasticity of WTP. 
                       All Nonusers Users Payment vehicle  
    Tax Recreation pass 
 coefficient 
(p-value) 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
α  3.60 
(.0000) 
3.46 
(.0000) 
3.97 
(.0000) 
3.19 
(.0000) 
3.97 
(.0000) 
Mβ  0.10 
(.0378) 
0.12 
(.0343) 
0.06 
(.4923) 
0.20 
(.0137) 
0.01 
(.8685) 
σ  1.32 
(.0000) 
1.36 
(.0000) 
1.21 
(.0000) 
1.49 
(.0000) 
1.18 
(.0000) 
WTP FIM per 
year: 
     
Mean 113 107 128 119 109 
Median 47 42 62 39 54 
wε  0.10 0.12 0.06 0.20 0.01 
N 1582 1272 396 753 829 
Notes:  α = constant, Mβ = coefficient for log of income (FIM 1000), and σ = disturbance standard deviation 
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Table 4. Fee revenue, efficiency and welfare loss for two fee scenarios.  
  
 Income 
 Lower than median 
 
Higher than median 
 
All 
 
Scenario I: Fee FIM 63
1)
 FIM 
Fee revenue              11 500 000                   9 300 000                 20 800 000    
Efficiency loss (EL)     
- lower estimate              25 500 000                 40 400 000                 65 900 000    
- upper estimate               28 900 000                 45 300 000                 74 200 000    
- mean              27 200 000                 42 900 000                 70 100 000    
Welfare loss (WL)    
- lower estimate              37 000 000                 49 700 000                 86 700 000    
- upper estimate               40 400 000                 54 600 000                 95 000 000    
- mean              38 700 000                 52 200 000                 90 900 000    
EL/WL                         0.70                            0.82                            0.77    
Scenario II: Fee FIM 12
2)
  
Fee revenue              10 700 000                 16 200 000                 26 900 000    
Efficiency loss (EL)     
- lower estimate                7 900 000                   5 900 000                 13 800 000    
- upper estimate                 9 300 000                   6 800 000                 16 100 000    
- mean                8 600 000                   6 400 000                 15 000 000    
Welfare loss (WL)    
- lower estimate              18 700 000                 22 100 000                 40 700 000    
- upper estimate               20 000 000                 22 900 000                 42 900 000    
- mean              19 400 000                 22 500 000                 41 800 000    
EL/WL 0.44 0.28 0.36 
Notes:
 
 
1)
 WTP (FIM 84) divided by average number of visits of all respondents per year (1.35)  
2)
 WTP (FIM 84) divided by average number of visits of users per year (7.08) 
